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COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION· 

of 25 May 1994 

concerning the taxation of small and. medium-sized enterprises 

, ----------_.... 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
The importance of SMEs in creating jobs and stimulating growth has been emphasized 
on several occasions in declarations and resolutions by the European Council, the 
Council and Parliament. The European Council in Edinburgh on II· and 
12 December 1992 made a special call for measures to promote private investment. 
especially investment by SMEs. 
The Commission White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment stressed the 
responsibility of governments and the Community in creating an environment which is as 
conducive as ~ssible to the competitiveness of enterprises, and ~ in particular SMEs. 
given that their dynamism, productivity, flexibility and innovation are vital to the 
European economy. 
The need to create a more favourable environment for enterprises is central to the 
strategic programme for the internal market 1 drawn up by the Commission. Support for 
the development of SMEs is essential if the internal market is lobe fully effective. And 
improving the tax environment for SMEs is a key aspect of the initiatives proposed for 
that purpose. 
The Commission has looked into the tax treatment of such enterprises, in line with the 
thinking put forWard in the White Paper, with a view to making it easier for SMEs to 
meet the new requirements of competitiveness. 
COM(93) 632 final of 22 December 1993 • Communication from the Commission to the Council: 
"Making the most of theintel'l1al market'l: Strategic -programme. 
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. " 
A detailed examination ofhow enterprises are taxed reveals a disparity in tax treatment 

· clepending on the legal form under which they operate (see findings in Annex). Because 

of their -legal form, sole proprietorships and partnerships very often have to pay income 

. . . . 
tax onthe whole. of their income. The progressiveness of the tax scale means that the 
Dlarginal. rates of !.ax, while sometimes lower, are generally higher than the rates of 
.corporation tax. This tends to create distortions of competition between enterprises on 
.. ' the basis of their legal form, particularly since the self-financing 'capacity of sole 
proprietorships' and partnerships is likely. to be squeezed compared with that of 
incorporated enterprises of the same size or even . larger , owing to their heavier tax 
· burden. In certain cases' this may .affect the very development of the enterprise. Given 
the high proportion of sole proprietorships and partnerships in the European Union (it is 
often estimated that one out of two firms is not an incorporated enterprise), this tax 
". f~e has a quite significant impact. 
.So~e Member States have themselves introduced tax arrangements based on the concept 

of .tax neutrality between incorporated and unincorporated enterprises. While tax 

· n~u~lity· is never.' complete, better equivalence is achieved and there is minimal 

· t . • . 
< .interference between these . arrangements . and the general tax system. This special 
machinery is designed. to ensure more equal tax treatment of firms' reinvested profits, 
irrespective of their legal. form (Denmark and Greece), or place a ceiling on the 
·progressive tax on trading income (Germany) . 
. '. " 
However, in most Member States, the solution most frequently advocated in such 
. circumstances (even if its implications are complex and affect various fields outside that 
. of taxation, especially the social field) is to tum the sole proprietorship-or the partnership 
into an incorporat~denterprise. Tax-relief measures are often available in order to 
. ~, . ~ . 
'.' facilitate such operations. 
. " . 
. The Commission wishes to promote such arrangements throughout the Union by inviting 
.<theMember States which do not yet have provisions of this kind to adopt them or to take 
.·.;m~aS~s With equivalent effect. 
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The ideas outlined in this paper a.re based on the. available data and the answers suppli~d 
by Member States to a questionnaire on how enterprises are taxed and . what tax 
provisions are applied· when a· sole. proprietorship· or partnership converts into an 
incorporated company. 
ConcluSions 
Given that the vast majority of small and medium-sized enterprises are unincorporated " 
and considering their prime role in keeping economic activity dynamic in the Com~unity 
and in creating· jobs, the Commission is encouraging the Member States to adopt aily 
measures designed to correct the deterrent effeCts of current taxationstruc~s on the 
self-financing of sole proprietorships and partnerships. Greater fairness in the tax 
treatment of the profits retained or reinvested by those enterprises shoul~ by giving them 
a chance to improve their self-fmancing capacity and strengthen their caSh position; 
enable them to deal better with the difficulties typically encountered by SME$, 
. . 
particularly· at the bottom of the economic cycle, and to make the best possible use. 
thanks to increased capacity for investment, of the opportunities available when the 
economy recovers. These initiatives would also have th~advantage of giVing 
entrepreneurs genuine freedom ofchoice between the various legal forms under which to. 
carry on their activity by reducing the significance of the taxation factor in their choice. 
• .". > 
The special systems operated in Denmark and. Greece, and the German mechanis':fl' ..... 
provide an interesting illustration of the possible options. Other measures haVing 
equivalent effect are also conceivable (e.g. a special investment reServe). It is for the ,> . 
Member States to choose those procedures which best suit their domestic taxation 
-. 
systems. 
4 

Even if. because of the impact in fields unrelated to taxation. the conversion of sole 
proprietorships or partnerships into incorporated companies does not necessarily 
constitute the ideal response to the situation described. it is still a response, and it is 
desirable for an entrepreneur to be able to choose, throughout the life of his business, the 
legal form which is best suited to its evolut~on. Moreover, this is the preferred approach 
in a number of Member States. For, while the majority of them consider that, legally 
speaking, these operations entail the cessation of a business activity, the repercussions 
which this normally has in tax terms are often attenuated. 
An examination of the situation in the Community thus. reveals that the tax provisions 
applied when sole proprietorships and partnerships are incorporated make it possible 
(~ QveralUo guarantee a minimum level oLtax neutrality when the legal status is changed. 
Isolated changes in tax legislation are nevertheless desirable, particularly in order to 
generalize the options for imputation of business losses to the owner or partner, when 
they cannot be carried over because of the change in legal status. And there is a need for 
a reduction in transfer taxes ·Ievied on contributions ofassets which might be modelled on 
the deferment of taxation of capital gains often granted for the same assets. The 
Commission invites the Member States to improve the existing mechanisms or to 
introduce such mechanisms in order to ensure that, from the taxation point of view, the 
incorporation of sole proprietorships and partnerships can be undertaken as flexibly as 
possible. 
These two approaches should not be regarded as mutually exclusive and the 
Member States are, in particular, invited to draw on the original ideas developed in 
certain Community countries, with a view to devising, in partnership with the interested 
parties, those solutions which are best suited to dealing with the problem of 
se,lf-fi~ci~ Q,Y. &lU!iU and. m¢ium-st~ed t(merpris~1r. .I . 
. . 
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,COMMISSIQN'REcOMMENDATION 

of 25 May 1994 

concerning the taxation of small and medium-sized enterprises 

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European CommlJllity. and in particular the second . 
indent of Article 155 thereof, 
. , 
Whereas on 28 July 1989 the Council adopted Decision,89/490IEEC on the improvement of the 
business environment and the promotion of the deVelopment of enterprises, and in partic~lar 
small and me4ium-sized enterprises, in the 'Community{l), as revised by Council 
DeCision 91/319IEEC<2); , . 
, . . 
Whereas in its resolution of 17 June 1992 on Community action to.support "enterprises, in 
particalar small·and medium-sized enterprises, including craft-industry enterprises(3), the Council . 
confirmed its undertaking to support the consolidation of the action taken to help enterprises; 
Whereas by its Decision 93/379IEEC<4); the COUncil adopted, from 1 July 1993, a programme to 
intensify the priority measures and to ensure the continuity of an enterprise policy~ whereas the 
programme gives priority to improving the 'legal, fiscal and administrative environment of 
enterprises; , , ' 
Whereas sole proprietorships and partnerships make upa large proportion of small and medium­
sized enterprises, whose role in the creation of jobs has been emphasized on a 'number of 
occasions in different Commission communications, and. moreparticuiarly, in the White Paper 
on growth, competitiveness and employment; whereas it is necessary ,to promote the investment 
capacity of these enterprises; 
Whereas the method of taxing sole proprietorships 'and parmetshipS, :wliicli' are generally subject 
to personal income tax, a tax which is progressive in nature iii particular by comparison with 
corpOration tax,hampers the development of the self';'financing capacity of such enterprises and, 
in an economic environment where access to external financing is becoming more difficult, 
consequently restricts their investment capacity~ 
(I) OJ No L 239, 16.8.1989, p. 33. 
(2) OJNo L 175,4.7.1991, p. 32. 
(3) OJNoC 178. 15.7.1992, p. 8. 
(4) 01 NoL 161,2.7.1993, p. -68. 
Whereas the current structure of rates of personal income tax and rates of corporation tax distorts 
competition between enterprises. depending on their legal form. to the detriment of sole 
.	proprietorships and pal1nerships~ whereas it is desirable to work for gieater tax neutrality, at 
least as regards the implications which systems of taxation have for profits reinvested by 
enterprises and. hence for their self-financing capacity; 
Whereas several Member States have already taken measures to limit the existing distortion 
between taxation systems, according to whether an enterprise's profits are charged to personal 
income taX or corporation tax, either by granting sole proprietorships and partnerships the right 
to opt for payment of corporation tax on reinvested profits, or by limiting the progressiveness of 
personal income tax by comparison with the rates of corporation tax applied to incorporated 
companies; 
Whereas the incorporation of sole proprietorships or partnerships is likely to resolve,.despite its 
impact on areas unrelated to taxation which affect the entrepreneur and the enterprise, the 
prOblem of the level of taxation of the non-distributed profits of these enterprises; whereas such 
.an operation must' be carried out without giving rise to a significant revenue cost, 
HEREBY RECOMMENDS: 
Article 1 
_	Member States are invited to adopt those tax measures necessary to correct the deterrent effects 
of the progressive income tax payable by sole proprietorships and partnerships in respect of 
reinvested profits. In particular, they should consider the possibility of: 
(a) 	 giving these enterprises and partnerships in thi~ respect the right to opt to pay corporation 
tax and/or 
(b) 	 restrict the tax charge on reinvested profits to a rate comparable to that of corporation tax. 
Article 2 
M~ber States are invited to adopt or extend those measures necessary to eliminate the tax 
.Obstacle to changes in the legal form of enterprises, in particular the incorporation of sole 
proprietorships or par:tnerships. . 
Article 3 ,. 
Member states are invited to communicate, by 31 July 1995, the texts of the main laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions which they adopt in response to this Recommendation 
and inform the Commission of all subsequent changes made in this field. 
Article 4 
This Recommendation is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 25 May 1994 For th~ Commission 
Ch. SCRIVENER 
Member of the Commission 
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ANNEX 

I.. Cuuentsitui\tion as Rlards the taxation ofSMEs' profits 
In view of the importanc~ofSMEs for the European economy and their special nature as 
an economic and social organization, their current tax treatment in the Community 
should be examined to see' how their profits are taxed and in particular whether or not 
there are derogation measures in this field under ordinary law that are designed 
specifically for SMEs. 
1.1. Taxation of enterprises 
How an enterprise is taxed generally depends On its legal form rather than on its 
size. 
In the case of sole proprietorships, the enterprise's and the proprietor's income are 
taxed together, being charged to personal income tax. 
Partnerships are usually taxed applying the principle of tax transparency: the 
profits are taxable in the hands of the partners in proportion to their rights, even if 
they did not actually draw on those profits. The conditions governing the taxation 
of partnerships are in effect very similar to those applying to sole proprietorships. 
However, in some Member States these· firms are either subject de facto to., 
, . 
corporation tax if they are engaged in industrial or commercial activities (Belgium, 
Spain), or they may opt (France) for the tax regime applicable to incorporated 
enterprises. 
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· In the case of incorporated enterprises, corporation tax. is charged on the profits . 
earned by the enterprise itself. In principle, the shareholders and members of 
those enterprises are themselve~ taxable only in respect of the profits distributed to 
them. 
1.2. Establishing the tax base 
The in~ustrial or commercial profits of sole proprietorships or partnerships subject 
to income tax are, in principle. determined in the same way as the profits of 
incorporated enterprises liable for corporation tax. 
The rules governing exceptions under ordinary law essentially consist in flat-rate 
calculation of the taxable amount or simplification of the taxation procedures .. 
In practice, these arrangements generally concern only sole proprietorships in the 
craft sector or of very small size, given the thresholds for such measures (in 
France, for example. the flat-rate. arrangements are available only to enterprises 
with a turnover of less than FF 500 000, or FF 150 000 in the case of service 
enterprises) and the fact that they are rarely adjusted. While they offer the heads 
of small enterprises the advantage ora genuine simplification of their taxation and 
accounting obligations. these arrangements have the drawback of not encouraging 
them to introduce the management tools they might need in order to expand their 
business. In practice. the enterprises covered are often those operating at a local 
level. 
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, . . 
Enterprises subject to corporation tax are always excluded from the flat--tate 
arrangements. However, in Ii number of Member States such companies may, in 
particular . under the fourth accounting Directive, benefit' from simplified· 
accounting procedures if they rank as small enterprises. They may for example 
submit an abridged version of their balance-sheet and profit-and-Ioss account and 
supply tax information in a more condensed form, thus reducing the number' of 
forms to be completed at the end of the financial year~ However, they still have to 
compl~ with the usual accounting principles and valuation methods of the tax 
regime for industrial anq commercial prolits; 
In practice. in the majority of cases, with the exception of the tax treatment applied 
to proprietors' remuneration in accordance with the transparency or otherwise of 
the legal form chosen for the enterprise, there are no fundamental differences in tlte 
procedures for determining the basis of assessment for enterprises, large or small. 
incorporated or unincorporated. There are, however, major differences in the rates 
applied: the progressive scale of personal income tax, the standard rate of 
. . 
corporation tax, reduced rates, etc. 
1.3. Tax rates 
A look at the tax rates (see Note 1. page 23) shows that. in most Member States. 
the marginal rates of personal income tax are higher than the. standard rate of 
corporation tax, despite the. general trend towards reducing rates for both 
enterprises and natural persons. Because of their legal form and the absence of any 
distinction between distributed and reinvested income, sole proprietorships and . 
partnerships . are de facto taXed on the whole of their income at marginal. 
income-tax rates which may be higher thaD the corporation-tax rates. 
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This results in a distortion of competition between enterprises on account of their 
legal form, to the detriment of sole' proprietorships and partnerships. That 
distortion is all the greater the wider the difference between the rates of income tax 
and corporation tax. 
The system .01' taxation applying to sole proprietorships and partnerships acts as a 
brake on their investment-based development. Their self-financing capacity is 
reduced owing to the higher rates of tax applied to the top slices of income, which 
are those which pro.vide the greatest ~cope for saving and investing. 
Yet increasing the self-financing capacity of SMEs is the most viable alternative to 
their recourse to external sources of finance, access to which can be particularly 
difficult in the present economic situation, since financial intermediaries 
sometimes ~end - tollowing the euphoria of the 1980s - to be excessively cautious 
and reluctant to grant additional funding. It is therefore importanuhat enterprises 
should be able to generate sufficient own funds in order to weather any transitory 
difficulties resulting from external conjonctural or internal factors. When an 
enterprise is ina phase ofmll.jor expansion, the shift in balance which may occur in 
such circumstances makes it more vulnerable, particularly financially. 
Given that sole proprietorships represent, on average, almost half of all the 
·.enterprises operating in the Member States of the Community, and that they 
employ 10-20% of the labour force, the potential impact of this special tax feature 
is quite apprecia.ble. 
Since. the various legal forms are unevenly represented in the Community, this tax 
aspectmay influence the optimum level of investment within the single market. 
12 
.. , 
The distribution pattern of incorporated enterprises, partnerships and sole 
proprietorships varies considerably between the Member States, The number of 
incorporated enterprises is very low in such countries as Germany and Italy, and 
particularly high in France, Belgium and theUnited Kingdom (see table in Note 3, 
page 36, on the size of the enterprise sector in the Member States), It is usually 
smail enterprises which adopt unincorporated legal forms, although the situation 
varies according to' the Member State, In Germany, for example, some large 
enterprises are run in the form of partnerships; in Belgium, small enterprises do 
not hesitate to incorporate, while only a limited number of large enterprises use 
incorporation in Germany. 
II. Ad boc solutions in some of tbe' Member States 
In Denmark, the sole proprietor may, each year, elect to be taxed at the rate of 
corporation tax on income retained within the firm. Under this special scheme, 
which has been in force since 1987 (specjal, business arrangement or "business 
rules"), a distinction is made~with regard to the nature of the income withdrawn by 
the entrepreneur, between income from capital and personal income. Income from 
capital,.whichisdeterminedby applying the average rate of return on bonds for the 
year to the enterprise's net assets, qualifies for the preferential tax treatment of 
dividends (traditionally applied to income from shales). Personal income, i.e. the 
income withdrawn by the entrepreneur in addition to the return on capital, is taxed 
applying the sliding scale of income tax. This method, which is used by about 
130 000 fmns, makes it possible to achieve equality of tax treatment between sole 
proprietorships, partnetships and incorporated enterprises as regards income 
retained within the enterprise, since the latter is taxed at 34% - the same rate as 
corporation tax. The scheme is described in more detail in Note 4, page 37. 
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Norway and Sweden. too, have schemes which are relatively similar in conception 
to the Danish 'one. The downside of this tax arrangement is that it imposes more 
administrative constraints (prinoipally ofan accounting nature) on those enterprises 
which opt for it. 
In Greece, the tax reform of June 1992 introduced a related mechanism for 
enterprises formed as partnerships, limited partnerships or private limited 
companies; . previously ,these had been subject to the progressive scale of income 
tax, ranging from 5% to 40010. Following the reform, their profits will be taxed at 
the single rate of 35% (as. in the case of public limited companies) Jess the 
remuneration of partners or managers (natural persGns holding at least one third of 
the partnership'slcompany's sharesj. Such remuneration, whether in effect 
. . 
withdrawn or not, is estimated at a flat rate of 50% of the partnership's/company's 
net income, with the partller or manager liable for personal income tax on it. The 
advantage of the. reform is that it provides forneutra1 treatment of the profits 
ploughed back by enterprises in the above categories. 
In' Germany, a provision has been introduced with effect from 1 January 1994 
whereby progressivencesof income tax on the profits of sole proprietorships and 
partnerships is limited, the maximum at marginal rate of tax for this type of income 
being capped at 47%. By contrast, the highest rate (53%) will continue to apply, 
where' appropriate, to all the other taxable income of taxpayers. The difference 
between the rate of corporation tax (45% on undistributed profits2) and that of the 
tax on the income of non-incorporated enterprises (47%) will henceforth be only 
two percentage points; . it would have been more than four times greater had it not 
been capped. While the measure is of a different order to those introduced by 
Greece and Denmark, in that it covers all the income, whether distributed or 
undistributed, of the enterprises concerned, it still shows a similar willingness to 
limit the differences of tax treatment between the ploughed-back profits of 
incorporated enterprises and those of sole partnerships and partnerships. 
2 The. rate is 30% for distributed profits. 
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Diese Beispiele iHustrieren. weiche Losungen mOglich sind, ohne mit dem 
. . 
aUgemeiiien Steuersystem in Konfliktzugeraten (Danemark, Griechenland) oder 
das traditioneH fUr Einzeluntemehmen'und Personengesellschaften geltende 
Durchgriffsprinzip aufzugeben (Deutschland)~ 
Welehe/Lehren kann die Gemeinschaft ausdiesen MaBnahmen ziehen? 
Hier 'geht es nicht rlarum, eine einzige dieser Losungen· als Modell fur die 
Gemei~haft zu wahlen - siealle haben ihre Vor- und Nachteile. 
So stchtder Dillerenzicrtheit und Angemesscnheit des danischcn Systems mil 
dem angestrebten Zid steuerlicher Neutralitat die komplexe Verwaltung dieses 
Systems. gegenUber. Das danische Steuergesetz mumt dem Untemehmer 
(Einzeluntemehmen und Personengesellschaften) die M{jglichkeit ein, jedes Jahr 
zwischen der Sonderregelung und der normalen Einkommensteuerregetung zu 
wahlen, so daB er den Umfang der SelbstfinaJ1Zierung des Untemehmens durch 
die Wahl der je nach Untemehmensergebnis steuerfich gUnstigsten Regelung 
optimieren kann. Die Sonderregelung setzt jedoch voraus, daB sich der 
Untemeruner zu einer detaillic:rten BuchfUhiung zwingt. Zwang ist hier jedoch ein 
relati.ver 8egriff, da die buchhalterischen Anforderungen positive pa.dagogische 
Auswirkungen haben konnen, indem sie den Untemehmer dazu veranlassen,/sich 
die fUr eine gute Leitung seines Untemehmens erforderlichen. 
Informationshilfsmittel zu verschaffen. Au8erdem sind mit dieser maximalen' 
steuerlichen Flexibilitat weitere negative Konsequenzen in Form -erheblicher 
BelastungenfUr den staatlichen Haushalt verbunden. Diese Belastungen lie Ben 
sich mit Regelungen, durch die die einmal getroffene Wahl fUr einen 
Mindestzeitraum (von tUnf Jahren oder mehr) oder unwiderruflichfestgeschrieben 
. ware, zweifellos begrenzen. Doch waren derartige RegeJungen mit hoheren 
Verwaltungskosten fUr die Steuerbehorden verbunden, da sie ·strenge Kontrollen 
durchfiihren mOOten, urn eine iniBbrauchliche Inanspruchnahme derartiger 
Sonderregelungen zu verhindem. 
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(3) 
, -
Der ~orteil des ariechischen Systems besteht darin. daB einbehaltene Gcwinne 
von Personengescllsch~ftcn (Einzcluntcrnchmcn sind von dieser Regelung 
ausgeschlosscn) und KapitaJgcselischullcn slcuerJich glcich behandelt werden - in 
beiden Fillen wird ein KOrperschaftsteuersatz von 35 % erhoben. Diese generell 
· angewandte Regelung weist jedoch de~ Nachteilauf, daB den Untemehmen keine 
Wahlfreiheit bleibt: Die neue Steuerregelung k.ann negative Konsequenzen fUr 
..' diejenigenkleineren Untemehmen haben, die bisher mit einelll niedrigeren 
, Grenzsteuersatz der Einkommensteuer unterlagen. 
· Der besondere Vorteil. des 'deutscben Mecbanismus der Begrenzung der 
Progression der Einkommensteuer auf'gewerbliche EinJefinfte. besteht in seiner 
einfachen Umsetzung.Dochhat erden Nachteil, das Steuersystem zu verzerren. 
, indem er denselbStiindigen Untcrnehmer. dessen Steucrsatz 47 % nicht 
uberschreiten kann, vorteilhafter behandelt als den abhiingig Beschaftigten, 
d~ssen Steuerlast 53 % betragen kann, selbst wenn letzterer - beispielsweise als 
Geschaftsfiihrer - eine ebenso graDe Verantws>rtung tragt. 
Diese Unterschiede resultieren in erster Linie aus sowohl steuertechnisch als auch 
,politisch bedingten Entscheidungen, die speZiflschen nationalen Gegebenheiten 
.' 
R~hnung tragen. 
Dennoch haben aile diese LOsungen - so unterschiedlich sie auch sein mOgen -die 
positive Wirkung, dazu beizutragen, den fUr die Besteuerung einbehaltener 
Gewinne von Einzelgesellschaften undPersonengesellschaften geltenden Satz 
dem KOrperschaftsteuerregt(lsatz filr die Besteuerung einbehaltener Gewinne von 
· Kapitalgesellschaften anzugleichen. 
,- : 
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Es sind weitere Variartten mit' ihnlicher Wirkung denkbar. So kOnnte 
, beispielsweise eine steuerlich gllnstigere Behandlung der Investitionstlltigkeitd~s 
Einzelunternehmens odei- der PersonengeseUschaft darin bestehen. zwisc;h.en 
einbehaltenenund 'VomUntemehmer oder den Anteilseignem entnommenen. 
Gewinnen zu unterscheiden. Dieeinbehaltenen Gewinnewikden - sOfem der. 
Untemehmer (oder die Anteilseigriereinstimmig) widerruflich oder. 
. 	 . . 
unwiderruflich ft1r dieSe Regelung optiert - mit dem Korperschaftsteuersati belegt 
und nUr' dieentnomtrienen Gewinne .als gewerbliche Einkiinfte mit ····der 
Einkommensteuer des Untemehmers (oder der Anteilseigner). . 'r 
.	Zwar tnachen; die sk8BdinaVlschenMaBnahmen und insbesondere das dariische 
Beispiel deutlich, daBderartige· Regelungen durchfiihrbar sind. doch sef auch . 
darauf hingewiesen. daB in einigen Mitgliedstaaten diesbezUglich eine geWisse 
Skepsis herrscht.· Sowird In Deutschland.aufgrund der einschUigigert Erfahrunge~ 
. 	 . 
zu Begiml der' 50er Jahreund im Vereinigten Konigreich aufgruild·. von' 
,Untersuchungen der Steuerverwaltung daran gezweifelt,daB ein Systerii,'bei'dem 
" < 
die einbehaltenen Gewinne von. Einzeluntemehmen und Personengesellschaft#ri. 
wahlweise der KOrpersehaftsteuerunterworfen werden, angesichts vor. aHem der 
Schwlerlgkeit. die EinkommensstrOme zwisch.en Unteme~er und.Untemehme!1 
zu kontroUieren, und der Gefahreiner miBbdiuchlichen Anwendung derRegelung 
, uberhaupt praktikabel wire. 
In diesem Zusammenhang ,Wurde . als Altemativevorgeschlagen, . den 
Untemehmen die Bildung spezifischer InvestitionsrUcldagen zu gestalten.' durch , 
die die. Selbstfinanzierungsmoglichkeiten der Untemehmen' erweitert .und 
gleichzeitig sichergestellt wiirde, daB die Mittel ft1r Investitionen (materiell~roder 
immaterieller Art) verwendet werden. Auch bier wire es den Mitgliedstaaten 
ubedassen, . wieviel Freih~it sie·· den Uniemehmen bei der Ve~endung und 
Zweckbestimmung ihrer SelbstfmanZierung lassen (beispielsweise Verbesserung 
der Liquiditlt oder AUsrtlstUngsinvestitionen). 
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1m Mittefpunkt der bisher dargelegten Losungen steht das Bestreben, die 
Gewinnthesaurierung von Unternehmen aller Rechtsformen steuerlich· neutral zu 
gestalten. Der Vorteil dieser Mechanismen besteht darin, Uber die Besteuerung das 
Entwicklungspotential der Unternehmen zu f6rdern, ohne die bestehende Rechtsform in 
Frage zu stellen, rur die sich der Unternehmer ursprUnglicb aufgrund von steuerlichen3 
" 	 oder anderen Kriterien entschieden hat. Zur Zeit verfugt nur eine Minderheit der 
Mitgliedstaaten Uber derartige Vorschriften. 
Die meisten Mitgliedstaaten geben einem anderen Konzept den Vorzug, das darin 
besteht, 'die Anderung der Rechtsform eines bestehenden Unternehmens steuerlich zu 
erleichtern. 
III. 	 STEUERVERGUNSIIGUNG BEl DER ANDERUNG DER RECHTSFQRM DER 
KMll 
Zwischen diesem. 'und dem vorstehend erwahnten Konzept bestehen erhebliche 
Unterschiede. 1m Ubrigen handelt es sich bei beiden weder um exklusive noch um 
mit~inander unvereinbare Konzepte: Danemark, Deutschland und Griechenland, die die 
bereits vorgestellten Ad-hoc-Steuervorschriften zugunsten von Untemehmen, die !'Iicht 
in Form der. Kapitalgesellschaft ~ gefuhrt werden,eingeruhrt haben, sehen in ihren 
Rechtsvorschriften auch verschiedene Regelungen vor, um die steuerlichen Nachteile 
bei der Umwandlung eines Einzelunternehmens oder einer Personengesellschaft in eine 
Kapitalgesellschaft zu begrenzen. 
Die beiden Konzepte stellen jedoch auch keine gleichwertigen Alternativen dar, da sie 
mit unterschiedlichen Auswirkungen auf die Rechte und Ptlichten der Unternehmer 
verbunden sind. In die Entscheidung des Unternehmers, rur die AusUbung seiner 
Berufstatigkeit eine Kapitalgesellschaft zu grUnden oder·· nicht, spielen zahlreiche 
steuerfremde Faktoren hinein. Oer Umfang der personlichen Haftung des Unternehmers 
wird oftmals ein wicbtiges Entscheidungskriterium sein. Als weiteres wichtiges 
Entscheidungselement sei. der Umfang des .sozialen Schutzes (und seine Kosten) 
genannt, der dem Unternehmer je nach gewahlter Rechtsform zusteht. Wenn andere 
Personen ah dem Vorhaben beteiligt sind, werden auch personaIe Aspekte in die 
Entscheidung einbezogen werden. 
tn diesem Zusammenhang wird der Untemehmer Seine allgemeine steuertiche Situation bewerten; 
in seine Entscheidung fOr oder gegen die GrOndung einer Kapitalgesellschaft werden sein 
derzeitiges oder erwartetes Gesamteinkommen hineinspielen. In· allen Fallen wird der 
Untemehmer seine Entscheidung in Abhlngigkeit sejner per50nlichen Parameter tretten, ohne 
sich notwendigerweisedarOber im klaren zu sem, wie sic;h seine Entscheidung auf die Kosten 
spaterer Investitionen und das Wachstumspotential des Untemehmens auswirkt . 
. . 
is 
3 
It should also be stressed that incorporation has a disadvantage for small 
enterprises in that it imposes on the head~of the enterprise a more burdensome 
administrative structure than necessary - particularly if the only purpose of 
incorporation is to improve the firm's tax position - weakening the. direct link 
which exists between entrepreneur and enterprise. 
Nevertheless, a solution to the problem of the unequal tax treatment of the profits 
of enterprises which are not incorporated and the profits of those which are might 
be to encourage the former to incorporate. While this might seem radical and 
possibly disproportionate, it would achieve the objective of improving the 
competitiveness of the.enterprises concerned. -If a change in legal form is 
facilitated or even encouraged so that a corporate form more adapted in tax terms 
to the enterprise's development is used, the tax constraints which may be 
encountered by an enterprise operated as a sole proprietorship or a partnership as a 
result of the entrepreneur's initial choice may then faU away. 
F or this reason, it is important that the tax system should generally offer sufficient 
_flexibility as regards the choice of legal form in which the entrepreneur intends to 
carry on his trade. While the entrepreneur chooses whether or not to go for 
incorporation when he starts up his business. a few years later he may want to 
review his original choice as his business grows. 
. . 
Bllt it is also true that the tax disadvantage from which the sole proprietorship or 
the partnership may suffer, as it grows, vis--a-vis an incorporated enterprise 
materializes when the level of profits generated by the enterprise place it towards 
the upper end of the scale of personal income tax. Such a situation occurs more 
often at the end of a strong period of growth than when the enterprise is first set up, 
the early years of activity being characterized generally by a iow, or even negative; 
rate ofreturn. 
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(4) 
i 
I ' 
While the need for the enterprise to be able to adapt its legal form to the 
requirements of competitive markets, and the benefits of the transformation, are 
clear, it is important to ensure that such a change does not entail tax costs which 
could discourage an enterprise from making it. 
In the majority of Member States, however, a change of legal form generally 
means the cessation of the business, with the tax consequences which that entails. 
and setting up a new legal person. Immediate taxation of the profits of the 
tinancial year, of hidden capital gains and provisions initially set aside free of tax. 
loss of the opportunity to carry over losses from previous financial years and 
liability for capital duty are the tax burdens which any enterprise taking this road 
will normally have to face. 
It is not often that an enterprise is allowed to continue, since legal formalism 
usually prevails over the enterprise's economic situation; most Member States, 
however, make a distinction according to the type oJ legal transfonnation 
concerned and its precise technicalities. Depending on whether the change is from 
sole proprietorship to incorporated enterprise, from partnership to incorporated 
enterprise, or from one fonn of incorporated enterprise to another, the continuity of 
the enterprise is accepted by certain Member States. Tax reliefs are also granted if 
certain conditions associated with the legal transformation are met. 
In the case of the incorporation of sole proprietorships, the notion that the business 

, should automatically be wound up - which is what most Member States would 

argue - may be favourably modified depending on the circumstances: thus, in 

Belgium, "continuity" of the enterprise is accepted for tax purposes if this is what 

the entrepreneur wants. 
Taking the transformation of a partnership into an incorporated enterprise, some 
Member States (Italy, Portugal) accept continuity, but most consider that this 
involves cessation of the enterprise and 'creation ofa new legal person. 
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However, whatever their attitude in tcnns of legal fonnalism (the enterprise may 
continue or should be wound up), most of the Mem,ber St~tes ,have introduced 
provisions which make it possible to attenuate the tax consequences of 
transformation. These measures, the details of which are given in Note 2. page 32. 
Member State by Member State, basically concern the opportunity to defer taxation 
of the hidden capital gains recorded at the time of transformation and to carry over 
the provisio~s relating to the activity without changing their purpose. Certain 
relaxations of registration duty are also provided for. 
It is also interesting to note that the PQssibility which has been created in France 
for partnerships to opt (irrevocably) for corporation tax has virtually the same tax 
effects as transformation into an incorporated enterprise. While the relief 
procedures are the same, there is the additional advantage that hidden capital gains 
and profits on which tax has .been deferred are not taxed, since no change is made 
to the accounts and it is still possible to tax capital gains at a later stage. 
Possible lessons from these measures for the Community 
Legal formalism continues to be the . dominant . factor in the Member States' 

assessment of whether an enterprise should continue in business when it wishes to 

change its form of organization; howev~r, ilie tax effects of formalism, which in 

virtually all caSes leads to the winding-up of the enterprise and the creatioQ of a 

.' new entity, are attenuated by practical measures designed to reduce or defer a 

number of taxes. 
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I 
Virtually all of the Member States thus'have provisions which allow the taxation of 
capital gains to be deferred until they are realized (usually on condition that the 
entrepreneur undertakes to hold on to the securities received in exchange for the 
capital contributed to the new entity and that the assets transferred continue to be 
, 
carried at their accounting value in the new entity's books) or allow the 
entrepreneur to choose between immediate taxation (which enables the new firm to 
calculate the depreciation of the transferred assets applying the value at which they 
were contributed and not the value at which they were carried in the books of the 
original enterprise) and deferred taxation. Only one country (Portugal) does not 
permit such choice when sole proprietorships are incorporated. 
Similarly, all of the Member States except Portugal allow provisions to be ' 
maintained if their object remains unchanged. Virtually all of them also maintain 
the enterprise's normal deadlines for payments. 
By contrast, legal formalism and its reflection in taxation do not allow losses to be 
carried over following a change in an enterprise's legal form. Some countries, 
(Germany, France, Luxemb')urg, United Kingdom) have indicated, however, that, 
in such cases, losses incurred by a sole proprietorship or partnership can be 
imputed to the entrepreneur or the partners. 
As regards capital duties, some Member States still apply relatively high rates to 
real property contributed, to companies (Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Italy), 
However, some Of these countries have introduced provisions to reduce this tax 
charge (Belgium, France, Spain) as long as securities are issued in return for the 
'contributions made. 'General introduction of such mechanisms in the Union would 
appear desirable. 
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ANHANGI 
GegeniibersteUung der Kiirpersehaftsteuer- und Einkommensteuenitze -
Auswirkung auf die Unternehmensbesteueruag, 
Sei einer' Gegenfiberstellung der Korperschaftsteuer- und EinkommehsteuersatZe in der 
Gemeinschaft ergeben sich je oach Mitgliedstaat drei Situationen(siehe Tabelle):' dies 
wird in den: nachstehenden Schaubildern veranschaulicht. 
In der ersten, Liindergruppe liegt der Korperschaftsteuersatz nicht nm unter dem 
marginaten Einkommensteuerspitzensatz, sondern auch unter dem niedrlgsten< 
Einkommensteuersatz. Bei der zweiten Gruppe ljegt der Korperschaftsteuersatz, zwischen 
den positiven, Eckwerten der Einkommensteuer.... In der letzten Gruppe ,finden sich die 
Lander, in' 'denen der Korperschaftsteuersatz gleich dem' marginaltm 
, Einkommensteuerspitzensatz istoder fiber diesem liegt. 
Danemark und lrland - Irland wegen des enniiBigten' Korperschaftsteuersatzes fUr 
das verarbeitende Gewerbe - gehoren,zur ersten Gruppe. Schon'der Vergleich det 
Struktur der ,Steuersatze zeigt eindeutig die Begilnstigung cler 
korperschaftsteuerpflichtigen Unternehmen gegenfiber den Einzelunternehmen und 
einkommensteuerpflichtigen, ,Personengesellschafien hinsichtlich der steuerlichen 
Veranlagung ibrer Gewinne. Be~ sonst gIeichbleibenden VQraussetzungen ist eine 
derartige fiskalische Behandlung ,ein nicht zu leugnender Anreiz fUr die Grilndung 
eines Unternehmens mit eigener Rechtspersonlichkeit (sofem die administt:ativen 
Kosten nieht prohibitiv sind). 
Diese Anreizwirkung ist bei der zweiten Uindergruppe dagegen schwacher; :iu 
dieser Gruppe gehOren die meisten Mitgliedstaaten (Belgien, Spanien, Frankreich, 
Griechenland, Irland (auBer verarbeitendes Gewerbe), Luxemburg, Niederlande, 
, 
Vereinigtes K6nigreich). Die Rechtsform der Einzelfirma ist von Vorteil, solange 
der steuerpflichtige Gewinn. relativ niedrig liegt (ohne etwaige Einkommen aus 
anderen Quellen); je h6her er jedoch /ausfiUlt, desto starker benachteiligt der 
Schwellen- und Schereneffekt - weil die Einkommensteuer, anders als die 
K5rperschaftsteuer, progressiv ist - Einzeluntemehmen gegenuber beispielsweise 
Kap~ta1gesellschaften. ,Dies gilt auch fUr die einkommensteuerptlichtigen 
Personengesellschaften. 
Allerdings ist festzustellen, daB zu dieser zweiten Gruppe drei Mitgliedstaaten 
gehOren (Belgien, Luxemburg und Vereinigtes K6nigreich), die einen progressiven 
KOrperschaftsteuertatif anwenden. 
(a) 	 AuBer in Belgien, das praktisch die Voraussetzungen definiert und diese 
Vorteile. den KMU vorbeMlt, sind die ermaBigten Steuersatze Teil der 
normalen Struktur der K6rperschaftsteuerslitze und gelten eher. fUr die 
niedrigen Gewinne der groBen oder kleinen Gesellschaften als fUr die kleinen 
.. ;Gesellschaften im eigentlichen Sinne, $elbst wenn diese letzten Endes 
statistisch am meisten betroffen sind. Durch diese MaBnahmen kann 
, 	 .­
jedenfalls. der Steuerdruck auf die klein~n Gesellschaften abgeschwacht und 
ihnen,ihr Start somit erleichtert werden. 
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(b) 	 Die Korperschafisteuerprogression lii8t sich in diesen drei'" Sonderflillen 
natOrlich mit dem progressiven Tarlf der Einkommensteuervergleichen, der 
Einzelun~emehmer in allen Mitgliedstaaten'unterliegen. Zwar 'entsprecben"die 
ermiBigten' Korperschaftsteuersatze in Belgien, und im Vereinigten 
" Konigreich mehr oder weniger den Steuersatzen der niedrigsien Klassen 
(28 o/0/26,75%;bzw. 250/0/25 %), doch ist die Progressionderentsprechenden 
Einkommensgruppenvollkommen anders geartet. In den drei ,genannten . 
Mitgliedstaaten ist die niedrlge Korperschaftsteuerklasse,mit enniBigtem Satz 
hoher oder gieich der zurn marginalen Spitzensatz besteuerten hOchsten 
Einkommensteuerklasse. Praktisch bleibt die Besteuerung der kleinen 
Handelsgesellschaften vorteilhafter als die der Einzelfinnen. 
(c) 	 Zu dieser zweiten Gruppe gehoren auch die Niederlande. die einen 
degressiven .Korperschaftsteuertarif anwerid!'n, und zwar miteinem Satz in 
Hohe von 40 % aufdie ersten 100.000 HFL Gewinn und einem Satz in Hohe 
von 35 % fUr darQber hinausgehende Gewinne. Diese Sitze sind dem 
marginaten "Einkommensteuerspitzensatz (60 %) fUr Einkommen Uber 
fG.530 HFL vergleichbar. Damit soIl ein zu groBer Unterschied zwischen 
dem·, Steuersystem fUr KapitaigeseUschaften und'" dem fUr 'andere 
Untemehmensformen vermiedenwerden.4 ' 
1m Vereinigten KOnigreich ~rde kOrzlich ein weiterer ermlBigler Satz In HOhe von 20. % in den 
Einkornmensteuertarif elngefOhn; ergilt nur fOr eioe sehr niedrige Einkommensgruppe (die ersten 
2.000 UKl. das sind tund 1.500 ECU). 
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, Zuder drittenUindergruppe schlieBlich geh<5ren Italien und Portugal; hier sind die 
Abstlindezwischen den effektiven K6rperschaft- und Einkommensteuersatzen 
'(obetste Klasse) ,so gering, daB sich ab einer bestimmten Gewinnh6he eine gewisse 
,', Steuemeutralititt zwischen den Rechtsformen einstellt. Deutschland hat ktirzlich 
sein' Steuersystem in diesem Sinne geandert, um die ungeschriebene Regel des , 
"Quasip3rallelismus' 'seiner r~ marginalen K6rperschaftsteuer- 'und 
EinkommensteuerspitzensAtze einzuhalten. Seit dem 1. Januar 1994 gilt ein von 36 
auf30 %gesenkter K6rperschaftsteuersatz filr ausgeschiittete Gewinne und ein von 
50 auf 45 % gesenkter Steuetsatz filr einbebaltene Gewinne, so daB die Differenz 
-zwischen lc~tzterem Satz und dem marginalen Spitzensatz' (53 %) ~ der 
Einkommensteuer von bisher 3 Punkte auf 8 Punkte gestiegen ware, wenn nicht 
beschlossen worden ware, den Einkommensteuersatz fUr Einkunfte aus 
. "'. - ' 
Gewerbebetrleb auf 47 % zu begrenzen, urn eine gewisse GleichmaBigkeit in der 
, 
•steuerlichen Belastung der' k6rperschaftsteuerpflichtigen und der 
einkommensteuerpflichtigen Untemehmen zu erhalten. 
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Comparative table of rates of corporation· tax and personal income tax: all Icvelsllf 
govcmment(*) ( 1(94) 
Country 
Rate of personal income .. 
tax 
Differential\ ft ft J 
pen.ine. 
taxlcorp. tax 
Rate of corporation tax 
Bottom 
rate 
Top rate 
GERMANY 19 53 (47)(···) -2 30/45 til 
BELGIUM 26.75 [25] 59 [55] -20 39% 
Reduced rates for SMEs(2): 
28% on profits between BFR 
oand I million, 36% between 
1 and 3.6 miJlion, 41% 
between 3.6 and 13 million 
DENMARK 38 (+5 points 
social 
security 
contribution) 
(8) 
58(+5%) -24 34 
SPAIN . 20 56 -21 35 
FRANCE 5 56.8 -23.47 33.33 
GREECE 5 40 -5 35 P) 
IRELAND 27 48 -9 40% 
Reduced rate: 10% for 
manufacturing companies in 
certain areas (Shannon. IFSC) 
ITALY 10 51 +1.2 52.2 [36] t'f) 
LUXEMBOURG to (+2.5% 
contribution 
to 
Employment 
Fund) 
50(+2.5%) -9.17 43.33 [33] (:l) 
Reduced rates: 20% (profits 
under LFR 0.4); progressive 
rates from 20 to 30% (LFR 0.4 
to 0.6 million); 30% (LFR 0.6 to 
1 million); 30-33% (LFR 1 to 
1.312 million); 33% (over 
LFR 1.312 million) 
NETHERLANDS 13 to} 60 -25 35% (but 40% for the first HFL 
100000 in proQts) 
PORTUGAL· 15 40· -0.4 39.6 [36] 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
25t I} 
.. 
40 -7 33% 
Reduced rate: 25% Oil profits 
below UKL 300 000 
. 
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(*) Rates shown in square brackets are rates of tax charged by central government. 
Effective rates include local taxation applied in certain Member States. 
(..) 	 The differential between the standard rate of ,corporation tax applied to 
undistributed protits and the top marginal rate of personal income tax. 
(...) Germany: from I January ,1994, the rate of personal income tax on commercial or 
industrial income is limited to 47%; for other types of income: the top marginal 
rate of53% continues to apply. 
, (1) 	 Germany: the rate of tax on distributed profits is 36%, that on undistributed profits 
50%. 
(2) 	 Belgium: this reduced rate of taxation applies to incorporated SMEs that fulfil all 
, the following conditions: . 
(a) 	 taxable income below BFR 13 million, 
(b) 	 no'more than half their shares held by one or more other incorporated enterprises, 
(c) 	 investment value of shares held no more than 50010 of paid-up capital, 
(d) 	 distributed profits not exceeding 13% of paid-up capital. 
(3) 	 Greece: for private limited companies, the 35% rate applies to the net residual 
. profits after deduction of the remuneration of the three main shareholders taking 
part in the management of the company. 
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(4) 	 Italy: enterprises with no more than three salaried employees in which the owner 
and members of the owner's family work are not liable to pay the local tax on 
profits (lLOR). 
(5) 	 Luxembourg: companies pay an additional contribution of I% to the Employment 
Fund and a local profits tax at an average rate of 10%. ' 
(6) 	 Netherlands: a social security contribution of25.55% is added to the bottom rateof 
income tax, making the effective rate 38.55%. 
(7) 	 United Kingdom: a reduced rate of 20% was recently introduced into the scale of 
. personal income tax. but only on a very narrow band (the first UKL 2 000, about 
I 
ECU 1 500). 
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NOTE 2 
Measures to alleviate tbe tax consequences of tbe conversion of sole proprietorsbips 
or partnersbips into incprporated enterprises 
Whatever the attitudes adopted by Member States on a formal legal level (continuation or 
cessation of the business in question), most have introduced arrangements for alleviating 
the tax consequences ofsuch conversion operations. 
With regard to the immediate taxation of profits, the great majority of Member States do 
not require early declaration of profits for the conversion of a sole proprietorship into a 
company but apply the normal deadline. for the declaration of income {France is an 
exception in that it requires a return to be·submitted within 60 days of conversion; 
Greece also requires almost immediate payment). 
Similarly, the great majority of Member States authorize carry-over of provisions where 
the purpose of such provisions remains unchanged. This kind of arrangement helps to 
ensure some degree of tax neutrality in the case ofchanges of legal· structure. 
By contrast, the· benefit of a possible carry-over of losses is frequently lost on a change of 
legal structure because the activity is deemed to cease. This applies particularly to 
conversion into a company; however, there are arrangements in some Member States 
(e.g. Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) for setting such 
losses against the personal income of the owner (or of the partners in the case of a 
partnership). 
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With regard to the . taxation of latent capital gatns on the conversion of a sole 
proprietorship into a company, the great majority of Member States permit the business 
either to.defer taxation or to be taxed at a preferential rate; others. permit enterprises to 
choose between immediate and deferred taxation (in France .latent capital gains on 
depreciable assets are automatically taxed on conversion to a company, although the 
owner may· choose between immediate and defel'l'eQ taxation of latent capital gains on 
intangible assets). In most Member States, these favourable arrangements are subject, in 
the case of a conversion operation carried out in the fonn of transfers of~assets, to the 
. , 
transfers being remunerated mainly through shares which the transferor undertakes to 
retain for a minimum number ofyears and to the assets being included in the new entity's 
accounts at their book value. 
It should be pointed out with regard to capital duties that the amount of duty payable on . 
the conversion of an enterprise is far froin negligible. T,ransfer duties are frequently 
levied on transfers of buildings, property rights and goodwill for consideration. The rates 
1 .,
of these duties can be very high. particularly in the case of transfers for consideration 
(this is the case, for example, where the company takes on the liabilities of the transferor~ 
under such circumstances, the transfer operation is normally treated as a sale). 
Directive 69/335IEEC of 17 July 1969 (OJ No L249 of 3 October 1969, p.25) does 
permit Member States to .levy transfer duties on transfers of immovable assets to 
incorporated enterprises·at a rate in excess of the. maximum harmonized capital-duty rate 
of I% applicable to other types of transfers. 
However, a number of Member States (e.g. Belgium, France and Spain) have adopted the 
principle which is most frequently applied to the taxation ofcapital gains in connection 
with a conversion operation: taxation of such gains may be suspended if the transferor is 
remunerated in the form ofshares; similarly, transfer duties may be reduced substantially 
(application o,f a flat-rate amount or reduced rate) it, for example, the transfers are 
remunerated by securities which the transferor undertakes to retain for a minimum 
period. 
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Tax treatment applied in the Member States when sole proprietorships'or partnerships are converted into incorporated enterprises 
Capital dut~ Capital gains Immediate taxation of 
profits 
Carry-over or losses Carry-over or provisions (*) 
Belgium 0,5%(1) 
(transfer of assets to an 
incorporated enterprise in 
. exchange for shares) 
16,5% for tangible assets 
33% for intangible assets (but 
temporary exemption if the 
business has not/specifically 
waived application of the 
"continuation" arrangements) 
no no . yes 
, 
i 
Denmark 
. 
1% rate taxation suspended in the case 
of payment in the form of 
securities (equal to at least 
75% of transferred. assets) and 
subject to the transferor 
retaining the securities 
no no yes 
(I) 	 Temporary exemption from capital duty in the case of transferts to companies established in an employment area, to headquarters of multinational companies establisehd in 
Belgium. to companies undergoing conversion, to 'innovative companies and to companies located in a development area. 
t·) 	 This involves the possibility of carrying over provisions whose purpose remains unchanged. 
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Capital duties Capitallains Immediate taxation of 
profits 
Carry-over of losses Carry-over of provisions (*) 
Gennany 2% (Grunderwerbsteuer) on 
transfers of land or buildings 
to a company 
suspension of taxation possible 
(if historic values are entered 
in the accounts of the recipient· 
company and if securities are 
retained by the transferor) 
no no 
(but can be set against the 
income of the owner or 
partners) 
yes 
Gr..!ece nonnal rate of 1% but rate 
varies between 3% and II % 
for the transfer of ~ building 
for consideration (fr~quent 
occurence in the caSe of sole 
proprietorships) 
no taxation of unrealized 
capital gains (except for, 
capital gains on property) 
yes 
1 
yes (1) yes (except for certain types of. 
provision: e.g. provisions for 
doubtful claims) 
Spain nonnal rate of 1% (corporate 
transactions) but 6% for the 
transfer of a building for 
consideration 
taxation suspended (in the case 
of transfers ofassets. etc.) 
no no 
\ 
yes I' 
Frdllce fixed duty of FF 500 where the 
transferor retains for five years 
the securities received in 
return for the transfer (failing 
that, a special duty of 8.6% for 
transfers of property and . 
goodwill) 
possible deferral of taxation 
(capital gains on non-
depreciable assets) if securities 
received in payment for the 
transfer are retained. In the 
case ofcapital gai~s on 
depreciable assets (tatxation 
effected in the hands of the 
recipient company), payment 
of tax is spread over five years 
yes (but the transferor is not 
taxed on profits relating to 
stocks if included at their book 
value in the assets of the 
recipient company) 
no (but for sole proprietors and 
partners the trading deficit of 
the business transferred is . 
included in the total deficit 
that can be carried over for 
five years for income-tax 
purposes) . 
.. 
yes 
I . 
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Capital duties Capital gains Immediate taxation of 
profits 
Carty-over of losses Ca"'ry~over of provisions (*) 
Ireland stamp duty of 1% taxation ofcapital gains is 
suspended if remuneration is 
in the form of securities 
provided that the securities are 
retained by the transferor 
no no (but carry-over possible as 
part of the overall deficit that 
can be carried over for 
income-tax purposes) 
yes 
Italy transfers of immovable 
property to companies (8%) 
taxation of capital gains 
suspended (if assets are carried 
in the balance sheet at their 
original value) 
not available not available not available 
LlIxc:mbourg real or personal ,estate 
invested: 1% 
in the case of assets transferred 
for consideration: from 0.24% 
to 6% depending on the nature 
of the assets 
no taxation of capital gains if 
th,e assets are carried at their 
book value in the accounts of 
the recipient company 
no no (but deductibility is 
permitted in the hands of the 
person who has incurred the 
loss, even if he is no longer the 
owner; tbe same applies to 
partners in a partnership) 
yes 
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.Capital duties Caplt~1 gains Immediate taxation of 
profits 
Carry-over of losses Carry-over of provisions 
Netherlands not available not available not available hot available n.d. 
PortUgal duty ("sisa" municipal tax) on 
transfers of immovable 
property: 
4% to 10% depending on the 
nature and use of the property 
- taxation ofcapital gains 
(st9Cks and assets) (I) 
- no taxation (tax neutrality) 
(2) 
no (1) 
~-- (2) 
no (I) 
I 
yes (2) 
no (I) 
yes (2) 
United 
Kingdom 
stamp duty of I% (land, 
buildings, etc.) 
taxation of companies in 
principle but relief is available 
(in the case of payment in the 
form ofshares) 
no yes (on future dividends) yes 
( I) tax arrangements applied to the conversion of a sole proprietorship into a company 
(2) . tax treatment applied to the conversion ofa partnership into a company 
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NOTE 3 

Comparative'figures on the size of the corporate sector 
(The ngures in 
this table are 
based on 1989 
data) 
Number 
ofcompa­
nies 
Population 
('OOOs) 
Number of 
'companies 
per 1000 
head of 
popu lation . 
Total taxes as 
%ofGOP 
Corporate 
income tax 
as%of 
GOP , 
Belgium 225,640 9~938 22.70 44.3 3.10 
Denmark 85,917 5,132 16.74 49.9 2.00 
Gennany 404,195 62,063 6.50 38.1 1.91 
Greece 
~ 
70,824 to,033 7.05 33.2 1.33 
Spain 655,491 38,888 16.86 34.4 2.06 
France 699,170 56,423 12.39 43.8 2.19 
Ireland 110,418 3,515 31.41 37.6 1.50 
Italy 300,000 57,540 5.21 37.8 3.40 
Luxemburg 
.. ' 
11,941 377 31.67 42.4 7.21 
Netherlands 
.. 
-
257;{)OO 14,846 17.31 46.0 3.68 
Portugal 171,919 9,793 . 1755' , , 35.1· .. n.a. 
Unjted 
Kingdom 
1,005,300 57,236 17.56 36.5 4.02 
Total 3,997,815 325,785 
Average 12.27 39.9 2.95 
\ 
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1 
NOTE" 
Description of the ttbusiness rules" - Denmark 
1. Natural persons carrying on business independently (as sole proprietors or partners) 
:.. can opt for the "business rules". 
2. 	 The objective of these rules is as follows: 
(1) 	 to render the business's interest payments fully tax-deductible (as is the case with itsi : 
other operational exPenditure); 
(2) 	 to ensure that that part of the business's profits constituting a return on its·equity is 
taxed in the same way as other capital gains; 
(3) 	 to counterbalance cyclical trends; 
(4) 	 to offer taxation at 34%, the same rate as corporation tax. 
3~1. The rules require independent businessmen to keep their business and personal 
finances separate for accounting purposes; distinct accounts must be kept for the. 
businesses income and personal finances. 
The business income is assessed in accordance with the general rules laid down in 
the taX legislation. 
If, i~ a particular income year, a business ~ho;s a Profit, this is divided into an 
imputed capital gain (i.e. the return on the ~usiness's own capital) and the remaining 
profit. . Capital gains are assessed as income from capital, like other return on 
capital. The remainder of the profit is assessed as personal income on a sliding 
scale. However, the profit is only liable to tax when it is withdrawn from the 
business. 
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Nevertheless, the taxable person may refrain from withdrawing the profit, or a pait 
thereof, and opt to retain it in the business. In that case it attracts advance tax of 
34% (i.e. at the same rate as corporation tax). It is only when the taxable person 
withdraws the accumulated profit in a subsequent year that it is finally taxed as 
personal income. The advance business tax is set off against the taxable person's 
and hislher spouse's tax for the year in question and the five succeeding years but 
cannot be disbursed as a cash payment. 
If the business shows a loss in an income year, the loss must first be set off against 
any accumulated profit. In the absence of any accumulated profit, the loss is 
deducted from the taxpayer's other income. Any remaining loss may be carried 
forward fur deduction against the business's profits and other income in the 
succeeding five years. 
3.2.J\s a general rule., there are no restrictions on the nature of businesses which can opt 
. for the business. rules. Nevertheless, if the business· reflects aspects of a private 
limited company, the option is not available. Income from such companies is taxed 
as income from capital. ,Insolvent businesses are likewise excluded from the 
business rules. 
3.3. 	If the taxable person operates a number of businesses, they must all be subject to the 
. bUSiness rules. Under these rules, all such businesses are treated as one business. 
~Ir the taxable person is married and hislher spouse operates hislher own business, 
the spouse must apply either the business rules or .the "capital gains rules" to hislher 
. . 
business. 
3.4. 	The taxable person is free to determine each year whether the business is to come 
under the business rules. 
If th~ ·taxable .person ceases to apply· the business rules without transferring the 
business. any accumulated profit is taxed as personal income in· the income year 
. following the ,income year in which he last applied the business rules. 
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If the taxable person ceases trading in respect of one of allumber ·of businesses' 
without transferring the business, any retained profits are taxed proportionatc~IY. 
A taxable person who has' previously applied the business rules in! respect of a 

business and, who, within the immediately succeeding five, income,years, resumes 

, application of the rules must, when calculating the business's capital account,assess 

real property at the value which was indicated when the rules were last applied. 
3.5. 	If the taxable person transfers the business or ceases trading as an independent 
business, any accumulated profits are taxed as unearned income in the same income 
year or, if the distinction between the business. accounts and the taxpayer's 
individual. accounts are maintained for the rest 01 the year, the succeeding income 
year. If the taxable person acquires another business befare the end of the 
succeediog income year. I)e may apply the business rules uninterrupted. provided 
that the distinction '. between the business, accounts and his personal accounts is 
maintained throughout the entire period. 
If the taxable person applies the business rules without interruption, the purchase 
price received on the transfer ofthe business is subject to the business rules. 
. 	 . 
Where one of a number of businesses, a business which has been separated from an 
existing business, 'or a notional part of a business is transferred. the purchase price 
received is subject to the busine,ss rules. The 'taxable person may'opt,tO transfer an , 
,amount not exceeding the net cash consideration outside the business rules to his 
individual finances, provided that a corresponding part ofany accumulated profits is 
withdrawn and taxed.as personal income in the same income year. 
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3.6. If a taxable 	person ceases to be liable to tax in Denmark or in any other respect 
acquires a tax domicile abroad, any accumulated profit is taxed as personal income 
in the income year inwhich he ceases. to he liable to tax or changes his tax domicile. 
3.7. 	Businesses subject to the business rules may be transferred and/or transformed in the 
same way as other businesses. If the business is transferred and deferred taxation , 
applies. taxation'of any accumulated profits may also be deferred . 
. . 
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